Abstract-This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the N -coalition non-cooperative games proposed in [1] . The objective is achieved in two manners: 1). the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is re-designed and a new Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm that yields less communication and computation costs, is proposed. 2). an interference graph is introduced to describe the interactions among the agents in each coalition. The newly proposed seeking strategy is then adapted for the N -coalition non-cooperative games on the interference graph. A sufficient condition on the interference and communication graphs is provided to ensure that the players' actions converge to the Nash equilibrium by utilizing the proposed seeking strategy. Several special cases where there is only one coalition and/or there are coalitions with only one agent are considered. The results for the special cases demonstrate that the proposed seeking strategy achieves the solution seeking for non-cooperative games, social cost minimization problems and single-agent optimization problems in a unified framework. Numerical examples are presented to support the analytical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years witnessed great efforts made by the researchers to study distributed optimization problems and non-cooperative games (see e.g., [2] - [19] ). Distributed optimization captures the cooperative characteristics of networked systems and covers many practical applications including economic dispatch in the smart grids [4] and resource allocation problems [5] , etc. Non-cooperative games, which catch the competitive nature of self-interested players, have been widely adopted to analyze electricity markets [2] , transport systems [6] , just to name a few. Motivated by the incentive to model the cooperative and competitive behaviors in economic markets and adversarial networked systems, an N -coalition non-cooperative game was formulated in [1] to accommodate the cooperation and competition in a unified framework. The formulated game concerns with a set of agents that form N interacting coalitions, each of which is M. Ye, G. Hu, L. Xie are with the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, 639798, Singapore (Email: mjye@ntu.edu.sg, gqhu@ntu.edu.sg, elhxie@ntu.edu.sg); F. L. Lewis is with the UTA Research Institute, University of Texas at Arlington, Fort Worth, Texas, USA and the State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China (Email: lewis@uta.edu).
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composite of a subset of agents that cooperatively minimize the sum of their local objective functions. Nevertheless, the coalitions serve as self-interested players in non-cooperative games. A Nash equilibrium seeking strategy was proposed in [1] to solve the N -coalition non-cooperative games.
The N -coalition non-cooperative games can be utilized to accommodate many practical circumstances in which cooperation and competition coexist among the engaged participants. For example, in group competitions (e.g., football games), the participants in the same group cooperate to win the game while different groups are competitive opponents. From another aspect, agents in multi-agent environment (e.g., transportation networks, cloud computing) may benefit from forming coalitions to perform tasks especially when single agent could not complete the task independently or efficiently [20] . The agents in the same coalition work collaboratively to serve the tasks while distinct coalitions compete for the tasks to gain payoffs. Moreover, the formulated N -coalition noncooperative games have great potential to address networked systems in which the agents are subjected to multiple tasks. For instance, it is promising to achieve multi-party rendezvous where the agents within each coalition need to rendezvous to a certain location while preserving connectivity with the agents in other coalitions. Motivated by the practical relevance, this paper further investigates the N -coalition non-cooperative games to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy proposed in [1] .
To relieve the communication and computation burden, a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed for the N -coalition non-cooperative games. The newly proposed seeking strategy follows the idea of implementing the gradient play by utilizing consensus protocols to estimate necessary information (see, e.g., [1] [2] [7] ). Consensus protocols were utilized as supportive tools to solve social cost minimization problems and non-cooperative games in several recent works including [1] [2] [7] - [10] and some other references therein. In [8] , the DIGing algorithm was proposed through imitating the distributed gradient descent via a gradient tracking recursion. A leader-following consensus protocol was leveraged to disseminate local information in [7] and [10] for non-cooperative games and distributed optimization, respectively. A dynamic average consensus protocol was included in an extremum seeking scheme in [9] , [2] and [1] for collaborative optimization, Nash equilibrium seeking for aggregative games and the N -coalition noncooperative games, respectively. However, in [1] , it assumed that the agents' objective functions are functions of all the agents' actions, which might possibly result in redundant communication costs if the agents' objective functions depend on only a subset of the agents' actions.
Game theoretic models for wireless communication networks and multi-agent systems involve typical examples in which the players' payoff functions are more closely related with the actions' of the players who are their physical neighbors (see e.g., [23] - [27] and the references therein). Considering the spatial reuse and the heterogeneous resource competition capabilities among the secondary users in the wireless communication networks, the asymmetric interference among the users was addressed in [23] , which generalized the symmetric interference in the atomic congestion games in [25] . In the sensor deployment game designed in [27] , the local utilities for each node depended on the actions of their in-neighbors only. To describe the interactions among the agents, an interference graph was introduced [13] [23]- [26] . The authors in [23] adopted a directed graph for the spatial spectrum access games and similar idea was utilized in [25] to describe the interactions among the players in the atomic congestion games. In this regard, the N -coalition game considered in [1] can be treated as a game in which the interference graphs for the coalitions are complete graphs. To further remove the redundant estimation variables in the strategy design, we introduce an interference graph to each coalition, by which the communication and computation costs are further reduced if the interference graphs are not complete graphs.
In summary, the main contributions of the paper are listed as follows. 1) A new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed for the N -coalition non-cooperative games. Compared with the seeking strategy in [1] , the new strategy requires less communication cost. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed seeking strategy covers the solution seeking for single-agent optimization, social cost minimization and non-cooperative games as special cases. 2) An interference graph is introduced to each coalition to describe the interactions among the agents in each coalition. The proposed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is further adapted for the game on the interference graph, which further reduces the communication and computation costs if the interference graphs are not complete graphs.
3) The convergence results are analytically studied by Lyapunov stability analysis. It is shown that under certain conditions, the agents' actions converge exponentially to the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition non-cooperative games.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The problem is stated in Section II. Together with its analytical convergence analysis, a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed in Section III. The seeking strategy is then adapted to accommodate the N -coalition non-cooperative games on interference graphs in Section IV. Numerical examples are given in Section V to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Lastly, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we revisit the N -coalition non-cooperative game formulated in [1] . In this game, there are N interacting coalitions (N ≥ 1 and the coalitions are labeled from 1 to N , successively) that are self-interested to minimize their own cost functions. The cost function of coalition i, denoted as
in which m i ≥ 1 denotes the number of agents in coalition i and f ij (x i , x −i ) is a function available to agent j in coalition i only. Furthermore,
where x ij ∈ R is the action of agent j in coalition i that is governed by agent j in coalition i. Hence, in the Ncoalition non-cooperative game, the agents within the same coalition collaborate to minimize the sum of their local functions, while constituting a coalition that acts as a noncooperative player in a non-cooperative game. The agents in coalition i are equipped with a communication network with graph topology G i C , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }. This paper intends to develop a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the agents under the condition that the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition game x * exists and is finite. Moreover, we suppose that the following assumptions hold throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1: The communication graphs G i C for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are undirected and connected.
Assumption 2: The agents' objective functions
where
T . Remark 1: Assumption 3, adapted from [7] [11]- [13] , assumes that the pseudo-gradient vector
is strongly monotone. Actually, strict monotonicity of the pseudogradient vector ((x − y) T (
∂y ) > 0, ∀x = y) is sufficient to ensure the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium [7] . A slightly stronger assumption (i.e., strong monotonicity) will be utilized to derive exponential convergence in the subsequent analysis.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING FOR THE N -COALITION NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
In this section, a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy will be proposed. Convergence results for the case in which N ≥ 2, m i ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } will be firstly investigated followed by several special cases in which N = 1 and/or m i = 1 for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }.
A. Nash Equilibrium Seeking Strategy Design
To search for the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition noncooperative games, agent j in coalition i updates its action according toẋ
δ is a small positive parameter to be determined andk ij is a fixed positive parameter. Moreover, g ijk is generated bẏ
is the element on the jth row and lth column of the adjacency matrix of
Remark 2: The design of the seeking strategy in (4)- (5) follows the idea of [1] to synthesize the gradient play and the dynamic average consensus protocol in [22] . However, the seeking strategy in (4)-(5) requires less communication cost compared with the seeking strategy in [1] .
In the subsequent analysis, we will firstly consider the case where N ≥ 2 and m i ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, followed by discussions on several special cases, where N = 1 and/or m i = 1.
B. Convergence Analysis
Case
where L i is the Laplacian matrix of
by which w ik (t) = w ik (0) = 0, and
i.e., g ik (t) = w ik (t) +
. In addition,
T , and 0 M be an M -dimensional column vector composite of 0. The following results can be derived.
Lemma 1:
mi , there exists a positive constant β ijk such that
Proof: See Section VII-B for the proof. Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, for each positive constant ∆, there exists a positive constant δ
In the following, we discuss some special cases where N = 1 and/or m i = 1.
Case II(N ≥ 2 and m j = 1 for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }): Without loss of generality, suppose that m j = 1 and m i > 1, ∀i = j. In this case, the seeking strategy in (4)-(5) for the agent in coalition j is reduced tȯ
which is equivalent to the gradient play, i.e.,
Defineḡ −j as the concatenated vector ofḡ ik for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, i = j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i } (as defined for the case N ≥ 2, m i ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }). Then, the following result can be derived.
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, for each positive constant ∆, there exists a positive constant δ * (∆) such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ * (∆)), x(t) generated by (4)-(5) converges exponentially to
In addition, if m i = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } and N ≥ 2, the considered N -coalition non-cooperative game is reduced to a non-cooperative game in which there exist N players and the cost function of player i is f i1 (x). Moreover, the proposed seeking strategy in (4)- (5) is reduced tȯ
by which the following result can be derived. Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumptions 2-3 hold. Then, the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is globally exponentially stable. Proof: See Section VII-E for the proof.
Case III (N = 1, m 1 ≥ 2): In this case, there is only one coalition and there are multiple agents therein. The formulated N -coalition game is reduced to a social cost minimization problem, i.e.,
Moreover, the seeking strategy in (4)- (5) is reduced tȯ
Following the analysis of Theorem 1, the subsequent corollary can be obtained.
Corollary 3:
Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, for each positive constant ∆, there exists a positive constant δ * (∆) such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ * (∆)), x 1 (t) generated by
T . Remark 3: In this case, Assumption 3 is reduced to the condition that f 1 (x 1 ) is strongly convex and Corollary 3 demonstrates that social cost minimization can be achieved without convexity conditions on the local objective functions.
Case IV (N = 1, m 1 = 1): In this case, the formulated N -coalition game is reduced to a single-agent minimization problem, i.e., min x11 f 11 (x 11 ),
and the proposed seeking strategy is reduced tȯ
by which the following result can be derived. Corollary 4: Suppose that Assumptions 2-3 hold. Then, x * 11 , which stands for the solution to the problem in (17) , is globally exponentially stable.
Remark 4: Corollaries 1-4 indicate that the considered Ncoalition non-cooperative game covers social cost minimization, non-cooperative games and single-agent optimization as special cases. Moreover, the proposed seeking strategy solves the aforementioned problems in a unified framework.
Remark 5: The analysis of Theorem 1 indicates that g ik (t) tends to zero as t → ∞ by which g ijk tends to
and x → x * as t → ∞. Note that if there are j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i } such that f ij (x) is independent of x ik , fij (x) ∂x ik = 0. Hence, there might be redundant estimation variables in the designed seeking strategy if this is the case. In the forthcoming section, we introduce an interference graph to further reduce the communication and computation costs.
IV. N -COALITION NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES ON INTERFERENCE GRAPHS
To describe the interactions among the agents in the same coalition, we introduce an interference graph (see e.g., [13] 
Ik denotes the neighboring set of agent k in coalition i in the interference graph G i I . In the following, the seeking strategy in (4)-(5) will be adapted for the N -coalition noncooperative games on the interference graphs, followed by convergence analysis.
Remark 6: Equation (20) is inspired by practical engineering systems in which the agents are more closely correlated with their physical neighbors. Take the wireless communication network (see e.g., [23] [25] ) as an example. In the atomic congestions games in wireless networks, multiple resources are shared among the players. Each player's payoff function depends on the number of the players that share the same resource with it [25] . By introducing the interference graph to capture the player-specific payoff functions in such games, the communication cost might be largely reduced for largescale games on sparse interference graphs.
A. Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design
To accommodate the Nash equilibrium seeking for the Ncoalition non-cooperative games on the interference graphs, the seeking strategy is modified aṡ
where k ij = δk ij , δ is a small positive parameter andk ij is a fixed positive parameter. In addition,
Remark 7: While the design of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the N -coalition non-cooperative game in (21) follows the idea in the design of (4)-(5), in (21), agent j in coalition i only generates g ijk /w ijk if j is a neighbor of agent k or k = j in the interference graph. Different from (4)- (5) where g ijk /w ijk is defined for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }, g ijk /w ijk is defined for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }, j ∈ N i Ik ∪ k in (21) . Hence, (21) requires less communication and computation costs if the interference graphs are not complete graphs.
B. Convergence analysis
In the following, we firstly provide the analysis for the case in which N ≥ 2, m i ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }. Then, the special cases where m i = 1 and/or N = 1 will be discussed. 
Define N C i k as the number of agents in G i C k and let
Then, it can be derived that
by similar analysis as in Section III-
Then, the following result can be derived.
Theorem 2: Suppose that for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }, the interference graph G The following condition, adopted from [13] , is utilized to ensure that By Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, the following result can be derived.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 2-4 hold. Then, for each ∆ > 0, there is a δ * (∆) > 0 such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ * ), x(t) generated by (21) converges exponentially to
In this case, the seeking strategy in (21) for coalition j is reduced tȯ
which is equivalent tȯ
Hence, in this case, the reduced dynamics for the agent in coalition j in (26) is the same as (13) . DefineḠ −j as the concatenated vector ofḠ ik for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, i = j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }. Then, similar to Corollary 1, the following result can be derived. Corollary 5: Suppose that Assumptions 2-4 hold. Then, for each positive constant ∆, there exists a positive constant δ * (∆) such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ * (∆)), x(t) generated by (21) converges exponentially to x * for every
Furthermore, from the above analysis, it can be seen that for the coalitions with only one agent, the reduced dynamics in (26) is the same as that of (4)-(5). Hence, for the cases in which N ≥ 2, m i = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } and N = 1, m 1 = 1, the results in Corollaries 2 and 4 still hold.
Case III (N = 1, m 1 ≥ 2): In this case, the seeking strategy in (21) is reduced tȯ
Similar to Corollary 3, the following corollary can be derived.
Corollary 6: Suppose that Assumptions 2-4 hold. Then, for each positive constant ∆, there exists a positive constant δ * (∆) such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ * (∆)), x 1 (t) generated by (27) converges exponentially to x *
T . Remark 9: In the above results, we suppose that the interference graphs for all the coalitions with more than one agent are connected. However, if there is an interference graph G j I for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } that is not connected, then, the coalition can be separated into several coalitions (possibly into several independent agents), each with a connected interference graph. For more detailed elaborations on the interference graphs, the reader are referred to [26] .
V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
An N -coalition non-cooperative game with 3 coalitions, each of which has 1, 3, and 6 agents, respectively (i.e., m 1 = 1, m 2 = 3, m 3 = 6), is considered in this section.
The objective function for the agent in coalition 1 is
The objective functions in coalition 2 are defined as
for agents 1-3, respectively. The objective functions for agents 1-6 in coalition 3 are 
respectively. Through direct calculation, it can be derived that the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition non-cooperative game in this example is x * = 0 10 . In the following, simulation results for the proposed seeking strategy in (4)- (5) and (21) will be successively presented. 
A. Nash equilibrium seeking without interference graph
In this section, suppose that coalitions 2 and 3 are equipped with undirected and connected communication graph topologies shown in Fig. 1 .
The simulation results generated by the proposed methods in (4)-(5) are given in Fig. 2 with the agents' actions initialized at x(0) = [−20, −8, −6, −4, 0, 2, 5, 7, 9, 20] T . The simulation result shows that the players' actions generated by the proposed seeking strategy in (4)- (5) converge to the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition non-cooperative games.
B. Nash equilibrium seeking with interference graph
In this section, we simulate the example by utilizing the seeking strategy proposed in (21) . The interference graph is given in Fig. 3 . The communication graph, which satisfies Assumption 4 is given in Fig. 4 . Correspondingly, G 3 C k for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6} are given in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that in line with Lemma 2, G 3 C k for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6} are undirected and connected.
Initializing at x(0) = [−20, −8, −6, −4, 0, 2, 5, 7, 9, 20] T , the players' actions generated by the proposed method in (21) are given in Fig. 6 . The simulation result shows that the agents' actions generated by utilizing the proposed seeking strategy in (21) converge to the actual Nash equilibrium. Moreover, different from Section V-A, by introducing the interference graph in coalition 3, agent 1 does not need to generate g 314 , g 315 ; agent 4 does not need to generate g 341 , g 345 , g 346 ; agent 5 does not need to generate g 351 , g 354 , g 356 , and agent 6 does not need to generate g 364 , g 365 , thus requiring less computation cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the N -coalition non-cooperative games formulated in [1] . To reduce the computation and communication costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy proposed in [1] , a new seeking strategy with reduced communication cost is proposed. Moreover, an interference graph is introduced to describe the interactions among the agents in each coalition. The proposed seeking strategy is adapted for the N -coalition non-cooperative games on the interference graphs. A sufficient condition on the interference graph and the communication graph is provided to ensure the convergence of the proposed seeking strategy. It is shown that under certain conditions, the agents' actions generated by the proposed methods converge to the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition non-cooperative games. In addition, several special cases, where there is only one coalition and/or there are coalitions with only one agent, are studied. The associated convergence results demonstrate that the proposed methods cover the solution seeking for the non-cooperative games, the social cost minimization problems and the singleagent optimization problems as special cases. 
VII. APPENDIX A. Preliminaries
A graph is defined as G = (V, E) where V = {1, 2, · · · , M } is the set of nodes in the network and E denotes the set of edges. The elements of E are denoted as (i, j), which represents for an edge from i to j. Associate with each edge (j, i) ∈ E a weight a ij > 0. Note that we suppose that the graph is simple, i.e., a ii = 0. The graph is undirected if a ij = a ji , ∀i, j ∈ V. The adjacency matrix A of graph G is a matrix with its element on the ith row and jth column defined as a ij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E, else, a ij = 0. An undirected graph is connected if there exists a path between any pair of distinct vertices. The neighboring set of agent i is defined as N i = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E}. The Laplacian matrix L is defined as L = D − A, where D is a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is equal to M j=1 a ij . A subgraph H G of a graph G is a graph whose vertices and edges are a subset of the vertex set and edge set of G, respectively. Alternatively, G is the supergraph of H G . A subgraph H G is a spanning subgraph of G if it contains all the vertices of G. In addition, a triangle-free subgraph H G of a graph G is a subgraph in which no three vertices form a triangle of edges. Graph H G is a maximal trianglefree subgraph of G if adding a missing edge to H G forms a triangle [13] [21] .
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Since
it can be derived that
where the notation [ * ] j denotes the jth column of * and β ijk is a positive constant such that ||[R iḡik ] j || ≤ β ijk ||ḡ ik ||.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
where P i is a symmetric positive definite matrix that satisfies (R
where Q i is a symmetric positive definite matrix. Moreover, the notation diag{h ij } for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i } is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are h 11 , h 12 , · · · , h 1m1 , h 21 , · · · , h N mN , successively. Then, the time derivative along the given trajectory iṡ
where the notation col{h ij } for i ∈ {1, 2,
(35) By Lemma 1, it can be derived that for x ∈ R N i=1 mi , there is a positive constant β such that
∂x || is bounded for x that belongs to a compact set. From another aspect, T that belong to a compact set Ω, there are positive constants γ 1 , γ 2 such thaṫ
and
Then, for each 0 < δ < δ * ,
Furthermore, by the definition of the Lyapunov candidate function, it can be derived that there are positive constants c 1 are c 2 such that
Hence, the conclusion can be derived by further utilizing the Comparison Lemma [28] .
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Following the definition and analysis ofḡ ik as that for the case where N ≥ 2, m i ≥ 2 for all i = j, the Lyapunov candidate function can be defined as
by noticing that the seeking strategy for the agent in coalition j isẋ
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, and is omitted here.
E. Proof of Corollary 2
The result can be derived by defining the Lyapunov candidate function as
in which diag{k i1 } denotes a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is k i1 .
F. Proof of Theorem 2
Following the proof of Lemma 1, it can be derived that there is a positive constantβ ijk such that
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, j ∈ N i Ik ∪ k, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }. The rest of the proof follows that of Theorem 1 by defining the Lyapunov candidate function as
where P ik is a symmetric positive definite matrix such that
where Q ik is a symmetric positive definite matrix.
G. Proof of Lemma 2
For the case where G i C = G i I , the conclusion can be easily derived by noticing that in G i C k , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m i }, all the vertices are neighbors of agent k except for agent k.
In the following, we analyze the case where G . Therefore, in this case, the subgraph G i C k is also connected thus completing the proof.
